历史与理论研究

1.历史与理论研究　History and the Theorist^[1]

本节导读

Marc Trachtenberg，美国著名史学家，1974年于加州大学柏克莱分校取得博士学位后，曾在哥伦比亚大学及宾夕法尼亚大学等教授历史学、政治学，现任教于加州大学洛杉矶分校。较有影响力的著作有：Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy，1916-1923（《世界政治中的赔偿问题——1916至1923年的法国及欧洲经济外交》）、A Constructed Peace:The Making of the European Settlement,1945-1963（《被建构的和平——1945至1963年欧洲问题解决方案之形成》）、History and Strategy（《历史与战略》）以及The Craft of International History:A Guide to Method（《历史研究取径与方法》）。Marc Trachtenberg致力于国际关系史、国际安全、历史研究法等学术领域，融合了国际关系理论以及史学研究方法，著作甚丰，对重大历史事件有深入的研究和独到的见解。

本文选自The Craft of International History:A Guide to Method，这本书为国际政治的历史研究提供了实用的指南。作者凭借自身深厚的学术造诣，指导读者如何收集和使用原始资料、如何对史学作品进行分析和评判、直至如何进行史学学术创作。作者不仅论述研究历史的方法与意义，也说明国际关系理论在研究历史中的作用。如在选文中，在论证研究历史的意义时，作者指出，历史不仅仅为理论研究人员阐述其见解提供例证，对其理论分析起到推动作用，更为重要的是，通过研究历史，学生可以逐渐产生一种“敏感性”，一种能够引导其作出智慧判断的感知能力。在国际关系各式理论纷争的今天，学生需要培养这种判断力，通过理论联系实际，才能辨清国际政治过程中的主导力量；而只有对历史有一定深度的研究，才能进行独立的思考，形成自己的见解。

A historical interpretation has to have a conceptual^[2]core.The facts never really just“speak for themselves.”The historian thus has to make them“speak”by drawing on a kind of theory—by drawing,that is,on a certain sense for how things work.But what does this mean in practice?What role does theory in that broad sense play in actual historical work?And how does a particular conceptual framework take shape in the mind of the historian in the first place?How should historians go about developing the sort of theoretical framework they need to make the past intelligible?Should they try to grapple with basic conceptual issues in a relatively direct way,by studying international relations theory and coming to terms with the arguments they find in that literature^[3]?Or are less direct,less formal, methods good enough for their purposes?

As for the theorists,what,if anything,can they hope to get by studying history? How can historical analysis be brought to bear on the study of theoretical issues? What in general can the theorists get from the historical literature?If historical interpretation has a conceptual core,doesn’t that imply that that literature should not be viewed just as a great storehouse of factual material that can be drawn on for the purposes of theory testing?Doesn’t that imply that the theorists might be able to get a lot more from it if they approach it the right way?

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History and the Theorist

Now let’s look at the issue from the other side.Why exactly should the theorist study history?It’s not hard to come up with some fairly obvious answers.History can provide the theorist with examples that can serve to illustrate^[4]particular theoretical points.Those examples can clarify the theorist’s meaning and also provide a degree of empirical^[5]support for the particular point the theorist is making.Empirical examples,whether cited by the theorist or not,can also help someone who is grappling with important conceptual issues to see the power of a theoretical argument.Thus Kenneth Waltz^[6]in his Theory of International Politics made an important argument, very much in the spirit of his basic structural approach to international politics, about the role of competitive pressure in shaping political behavior.Suppose you are familiar with this argument and then come across the case of a top Prussian^[7]official(Prince Hardenberg^[8])arguing in 1807 that his country had been unable to stand up militarily to France because the Revolution had“brought the French people a wholly new vigor”and that Prussia,if it hoped to survive,could not simply cling to the old order.The force of the new revolutionary principles was such,according to Hardenberg,“that the state which refuses to acknowledge them will be condemned to submit or to perish.”That way of thinking,it turns out,had a lot to do with the very important reforms Prussia adopted at that time.You note these things,and you’re struck by the way they relate to Waltz’s argument.His theoretical point takes on a certain reality quality.The historical example suggests that Waltz had not just come up with an interesting intellectual construct but rather that the argument he develops can actually help you understand how things work in the real world.

And studying history can help theorists see things they might not otherwise see. In international relations theory,an important body of thought“emphasizes the dangers that arise when the offense is strong relative to the defense.”You might find that basic idea quite plausible^[9].But if you study the Anglo-Russian relationship in the nineteenth century,a defense-dominant relationship if there ever was one,you might be struck by how bellicose^[10]key British leaders were at various points—for example,during the Near Eastern crisis in 1877.In that case,a rather different idea might take shape in your mind.Could it be that the danger in this case had to do with the fact that this was a defense-dominant relationship—that it was precisely because the risks for both sides were limited that statesmen could approach war in a relatively cavalier,and indeed frivolous^[11],way?Of course,even if that were true in this case,that in itself would not mean that the general argument about offense-dominance being destabilizing was necessarily wrong.But the example could nonetheless provide some food for thought.It might suggest that the theoretical issue was more complex(and perhaps even more interesting)than you had originally thought.

Of course,theorists can use history in such ways:historical examples can illustrate theoretical points,and the study of historical cases can serve as a spur to theoretical analysis.But if,from the theorists’point of view,that was essentially all that history was good for,it would scarcely make sense for them to go into historical issues in any great depth.Historical analysis,if that were the case,could scarcely play a fundamental role in theoretical work.So if historical work is important,it has to be because it gives the theorists something more than what I have been talking about so far.It has to give them something fundamental,something that relates to their core intellectual aspirations.

What then do the political scientists who study international relations really want to do?They would like,by and large,to do more than just say intelligent things about how international politics works.Their goal,by and large,is to move beyond the“essay tradition.”They would like their field to be a kind of science.Their aim is to develop not just an intellectually respectable body of thought but a body of theory.And their approach to history is often rooted in such aspirations.On the whole,they tend to be positivists^[12]at heart.They generally take it for granted that theories are tested by looking at the facts,and they often approach historical work from that point of view.Their assumption is that history can serve up the facts that are needed to test theories.

But one of the key insights to be drawn from the philosophy of science literature is that the very notion of“theory testing”is far more problematic^[13]than you might think.The problem derives from the fact that theories are not supposed to give as accurate a picture of reality as possible.The goal instead is to cut to the core—to simplify,to focus on what is driving things,to bring out what was really important in what is being studied.Theories therefore have to provide a kind of model,a somewhat stylized^[14]view of reality.And that model has to differ from the chunk of reality it is supposed to help you understand.“Completely eliminating all differences between the model and the original state of affairs,”as Hanson^[15]says,would destroy“the very thing the model was meant to achieve—namely,the provision of an‘awareness of structure’absent from the original confrontation with a complex of phenomena.”

This is as true in the study of international politics as it is in science as a whole. Explanatory power,as Waltz points out—and part of his eminence has to do with the fact that his approach to theory is rooted in an exceptionally sophisticated understanding of these philosophy of science issues—“is gained by moving away from‘reality,’not by staying close to it,”so it is a mistake to think that the best model“is the one that reflects reality most accurately.”Is the theory of gravitation defective because it fails to explain“the wayward path of a falling leaf”?Is classical economic theory to be faulted because it is based on a theoretic construct,“the famous‘economic man^[16],’”which,as every sensible economist knows,“does not exist”?To say that theory should try to replicate reality,“to say that a‘theory should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggests,’”Waltz notes,“amounts to a renunciation of science from Galileo onward.”

What then are we to make of the simple idea that theories should be tested by looking at the empirical evidence?A test consists of a comparison between what the theory implies and what observations show.If a theory is supposed to offer only a stylized picture of reality,a gap between the two is to be expected.How then can a discrepancy,even in principle,be said to falsify^[17]the theory?Such gaps, moreover,are generally not hard to deal with.As philosophers of science have noted for more than a hundred years,ad hoc explanations can easily be developed to save theories from falsification.The well-known philosopher of science Imre Lakatos^[18]tells a story(imaginary,but based on a number of real historical episodes)to illustrate the point.The path of a newly discovered planet is calculated using Newton’s laws,but the actual path of the planet is different.The Newtonian astronomer conjectures that the deviation is due to the existence nearby of another hitherto unknown planet,but new and more powerful telescopes fail to disclose its existence.The astronomer then“suggests that a cloud of cosmic dust”accounts for the fact that the telescopes were unable to detect it.A satellite is sent up to look for this“conjectural cloud,”but the result is another failure leading to another ad hoc conjecture.The process,he says,can go on indefinitely.Success at any point would be treated as a great victory for the Newtonian theory,but failure can always be explained away.At no point does failure mean that the basic theory has been refuted.

Lakatos’s point is that testing in science is not nearly as straightforward a concept as one might suppose.People think that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the theoretician and the experimenter,that“the theoretician proposes”and that“the experimenter—in the name of nature—disposes.”“Man proposes a system of hypotheses^[19],”as one writer put it.“Nature disposes of its truth or falsity.Man invents a scientific system,and then discovers whether or not it accords with observed fact.”But,as Lakatos argues,things are just not that simple.Ad hoc explanations can always be put forward:“the prime target remains hopelessly elusive.”“Nature may shout no,”but human ingenuity“may always be able to shout louder.”And it is for that reason,he says,that in science“falsifications are somehow irrelevant.”What really matters,according to Lakatos,are“dramatic”results, predicted by the theory,otherwise unexpected,and confirmed by observation.And he gives the example here of the 1919 experiment that showed that light rays from distant stars were deflected by the gravitational force of the sun,just as Einstein’s theory of relativity had predicted—a stunning result that played a key role,he says, in winning scientists over to the Einstein theory.

This general argument is certainly too extreme,and testing plays a greater role in natural science than Lakatos was prepared to admit.The 1919 experiment,for example,though very important,was not taken as absolutely conclusive.The relativity theory had also predicted the displacement of certain spectral lines,and Einstein himself recognized that the experimental test of that prediction was of crucial importance.“If it were proved that this effect does not exist in nature,”he wrote,“then the whole theory would have to be abandoned.”Similarly,the Darwin theory of the“survival of the fittest”is often said to be tautological^[20](because fitness is defined in terms of survivability)and therefore untestable.Darwin himself,however, took pains to point out ways in which his theory could be tested empirically—ways in which the empirical evidence would cause the theory to“break down.”

But even though Lakatos took the argument too far,there certainly was something to what he was saying,and in fact his basic point applies with greater force to a field like international relations theory than it does to fields like physics or even biology.In international relations theory,hard-and-fast predictions are rarely made; such theories thus cannot be confirmed or falsified in a relatively simple,straightforward way,as the term“testing”implies.Even in natural science,theories are normally not defeated instantly in a“simple battle”with the facts.In the international politics literature,where general claims are much less precise,the assessment process is even less cut-and-dry.It is really the spirit of a theory that is being assessed—whether it gives you some real insight into how the world works, whether it helps you see things you otherwise would have been unable to see, whether it can explain things that you otherwise might find hard to understand.And the key point here is that such judgments simply cannot be made in a mechanical way.Even in a field like physics,such judgments are governed“not by logical rules but by the mature sensibility of the trained scientist.”So in a field like international relations,where there is even less reason to assume that such decisions can be made in an essentially mechanical way,serious judgments have to draw on the“mature sensibility^[21]”of the trained scholar.

This is the real reason why history is important for the theorist.History is not to be thought of as a great reservoir of facts that can be gathered up like“pebbles on the beach”and drawn on for the purpose of theory testing.It is important because by studying history the scholar can develop the kind of sensibility that makes intelligent judgment possible.Indeed,it is hard to see how a scholar can develop that kind of sensibility without studying history in a more or less serious way.Purely abstract^[22]analysis can only take you so far.It can sometimes take you quite far.But at some point theory has to connect up with reality.At some point,it has to help you understand something important about the real world.So the key thing is to do the sort of work that can draw theory and history together.

Doing that kind of work allows you to take your measure of particular theoretical approaches and thus to develop your own sense for the sort of general theoretical framework appropriate for the analysis of the questions you are concerned with. You might in some cases be surprised by the degree to which a particular theory helps you understand a particular historical episode.You might be struck by how well the history and the theory resonate with each other.You might,in those cases, say to yourself:“I wouldn’t have expected to find something like this,but lo and behold,there it is,a finding very much in line with the way that theoretical argument says the world works.”When this happens,you sense that the theorist might be on to something important,something you previously had not seen.On the other hand,when the theory does not help you understand much of anything,that also has to be taken into account when you are making up your mind about these issues—that is,when you are developing your own understanding of how international politics works.Both positive and negative results feed into the assessment,and in both cases the real world connection is crucial.

Or to put the point another way:theorists often come up with interesting ideas about how international politics works—indeed,with ideas that are at times at odds with each other.But the fact that an idea is interesting or clever does not mean that it necessarily tells you much about how things work in the real world.You thus have to develop some sense for how important these various dynamics are.You need to develop some sense for how they stack up against each other,and thus for what dominates the international political process.Only by studying history in some depth can you make those kinds of judgments.This is particularly important because a major body of theory commonly makes a kind of meta-claim^[23]:the theorists who hold those ideas are in effect asserting that what they are emphasizing counts for more than many people think.Indeed,a body of theory needs to make that sort of meta-claim if it is to be of real value:theories that simply sum up what everyone already knows are not worth much.So one of the things that normally characterizes a theory in this field is that it is not universally accepted.Realists,for example,in effect claim that power political factors are a good deal more important than many people are prepared to admit.But judgments about the relative importance of various sets of factors can only be made when you get a real sense for how things actually work,and you can develop that sense only by studying the historical record.

But how exactly do you go about doing this?The basic technique is to take some major theoretical claim,bring it down to earth by thinking about what it would mean in specific historical contexts,and then study those historical episodes with those basic conceptual issues in mind.Exercises of this sort—exercises that bring the conceptual and empirical sides of the broader intellectual effort together—are a way of getting a handle on a problem.Abstract argument,as I said before,has a certain cloudlike quality.Theoretical claims are hard to deal with on a very general level.But those general claims translate,or should translate,into expectations about what you are likely to find if you study a particular historical episode.You can then look at that episode with those expectations in mind.The problems are now more concrete.The questions,being narrower and more specific,are more answerable.And given the way you have set up the question,the answers you reach are bound to give you a certain insight into the more general issues to which those questions are connected.

This is a very standard way of approaching major theoretical problems.In chapter 6,I’ll talk more about how in practice this sort of work can actually be done, but for now let me just say that in principle it is generally not that hard to see what theoretical claims“translate into,”in terms of specific historical interpretations.Indeed,theorists themselves often give historical examples as a way of backing up their arguments.If your goal is to assess those arguments,the historical cases they themselves cite are the first ones you would want to study.Waltz,for instance,says that one of the reasons why bipolar^[24]international systems are more stable than multipolar^[25]ones is that,under multipolarity,the“weaker or the more adventurous^[26]party”to an alliance can drag its partner into a war.He then cites Austro-German relations in the“prelude^[27]to World War I”as a case in point.If your goal is to assess Waltz’s argument about multipolarity,one of the first things you would want to do is to see what relations between Austria and Germany during the July crisis^[28]were actually like.You would like to see whether Austria was able to drag a reluctant Germany into the war.Did the Austrians,for example,feel that they could do whatever they wanted,knowing that the Germans would not be able to abandon them no matter what happened,or did they feel that they had to clear things with the Germans before they did something that might get them into real trouble with Russia?Did the Germans feel that they would have to support Austria no matter what,or did they feel that Austria could not move ahead unless Germany first gave the green light?These are all studiable issues,and answering them will throw some light not just on Waltz’s historical claim about the July crisis but also on the general argument that that claim was meant to support.

The basic point here is that if you want to get a real handle on a major theoretical issue,you often need to go into key historical questions in some depth.You’ve been exposed to all sorts of historical arguments in the course of your education, but many of them have to be taken with a grain of salt.Waltz might have been taught that Austria dragged Germany into war in 1914;I also remember hearing something like that when I was in college.But historical arguments you pick up in that way are often very much open to question.For serious academic purposes,it scarcely makes sense to take them at face value.If you accept them uncritically, you’d be building on an unnecessarily weak base.

思考题

1.What are the obvious reasons that theorists should study history?

2.Is theory supposed to reflect reality as accurate as possible?

3.What should we focus on in assessing a theory of international relations?

4.What is the real reason that studying history is important for theorists?

5.How do you bring theory and history together in getting a handle on a problem?