赫摩克拉底演说辞与弥罗斯对话录

4.赫摩克拉底演说辞与弥罗斯对话录　Speech of Hermocrates at Gela ＆ the Melian Dialogue^[90]

本节导读

古希腊史学家修昔底德（约公元前460—前395年）所著传世经典《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》，是一部在西方史学史上具有重要影响的著作，同时在国际关系研究中，被视为政治现实主义的开山之作。在这部著作中，修昔底德主要叙述了公元前5世纪下半叶以雅典为首的提洛同盟与以斯巴达为首的伯罗奔尼撒联盟之间的、对希腊城邦发展产生重大影响的一场战争，同时也表达了深刻的史学思想。在修昔底德的史学思想中，人性不变论占有重要的地位。修昔底德深入人的本性来探讨战争的起因，在他看来，雅典人和斯巴达人之间之所以爆发战争，不是因为两者之间的差别——一个是民主制的雅典、一个是寡头制的斯巴达，而是因为他们之间的共性——对权力和财富的贪婪和狂热追求，由此引起的利益冲突导致战争的不可避免。因此，修昔底德视人性为推动历史发展的动因之一。

《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》传世的本子分为八卷，其中含有大量精彩的演说辞，这也是该著作的一个突出特点。本文节选的《赫摩克拉底演说辞》和《弥罗斯对话录》分别选自第四卷和第五卷，为19世纪Richard Crawley的英译本。在《赫摩克拉底演说辞》中，当时的西西里岛内纷争不断，赫摩克拉底在众城邦代表前发表演说，以清晰的思路分析西西里面临的形势和众城邦的利益得失关系，说明了“兄弟阋于墙，外御其侮”的道理，在其中我们能看到“门罗主义”的影子。在《弥罗斯对话录》中，雅典使者试图说服弥罗斯岛放弃中立向雅典投降，于是便有了雅典使者与弥罗斯代表之间关于“强权”与“正义”的对话，其中对“丛林法则”描述得淋漓尽致。在这两篇选文中，作者都借助相关人物表达了对人性的思考，而后者更是集中表述了现实主义传统思想的基本观点。

Speech of Hermocrates^[91]at Gela

The same summer,the inhabitants of Camarina^[92]and Gela^[93]in Sicily first made an armistice with each other,after which embassies from all the other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring about a pacification^[94].After many expressions of opinion on one side and the other,according to the griefs and pretensions of the different parties complaining,Hermocrates,son of Hermon,a Syracusan^[95],the most influential man among them,addressed the following words to the assembly:

“If I now address you,Sicilians,it is not because my city is the least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war,but in order to state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole island.That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would be tedious to develop it.No one is forced to engage in it by ignorance,or kept out of it by fear,if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it.To the former the gain appears greater than the danger,while the latter would rather stand the risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice.But if both should happen to have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way,advice to make peace would not be unserviceable;and this,if we did but see it,is just what we stand most in need of at the present juncture.”

“I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first,in order to serve our own several interests,that we are now,in view of the same interests,debating how we can make peace;and that if we separate without having as we think our rights,we shall go to war again.And yet,as men of sense,we ought to see that our separate interests are not alone at stake in the present congress:there is also the question whether we have still time to save Sicily,the whole of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition;and we ought to find in the name of that people more imperious^[96]arguments for peace than any which I can advance,when we see the first power in Hellas^[97]watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters,and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to account the natural hostility that exists between us.If we go to war,and call in to help us a people that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not invited;and if we injure ourselves at our own expense,and at the same time serve as the pioneers of their dominion^[98],we may expect,when they see us worn out,that they will one day come with a larger armament,and seek to bring all of us into subjection^[99].”

“And yet as sensible men,if we call in allies and court danger,it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new acquisitions,and not to ruin what they possess already;and we should understand that the internecine^[100]discords which are so fatal to communities generally,will be equally so to Sicily,if we,its inhabitants,absorbed in our local quarrels,neglect the common enemy.These considerations should reconcile individual with individual,and city with city,and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of Sicily.Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians^[101]only are enemies of Athens,while the Chalcidian^[102]race is secured by its Ionian^[103]blood;the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of one of two nationalities,but by a desire for the good things in Sicily,the common property of us all.This is proved by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation:an ally who has never given them any assistance whatever,at once receives from them almost more than the treaty entitles him to.That the Athenians should cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable;and I do not blame those who wish to rule,but those who are over-ready to serve.It is just as much in men’s nature to rule those who submit to them,as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not less invariable than the other.Meanwhile all who see these dangers and refuse to provide for them properly,or who have come here without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril,are mistaken.The quickest way to be rid of it is to make peace with each other;since the Athenians menace us not from their own country,but from that of those who invited them here.In this way instead of war issuing in^[104]war,peace quietly ends our quarrels;and the guests who come hither under fair pretences for bad ends,will have good reason for going away without having attained them.”

“So far as regards the Athenians,such are the great advantages proved inherent in a wise policy.Independently of this,in the face of the universal consent,that peace is the first of blessings,how can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves;or do you not think that the good which you have,and the ills that you complain of,would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war;that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind,not to mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on^[105],with the not less numerous miseries of war?These considerations should teach you not to disregard my words,but rather to look in them every one for his own safety.If there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect^[106]his object,let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment.Let him remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves;while many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage,instead of gaining anything more,have been doomed to lose what they had.Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has been done,or strength sure because it is confident;but the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence,and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things,as it frightens us all equally,and thus makes us consider before attacking each other.”

“Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future,and the immediate terror of the Athenians’presence,to produce their natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out the programmes that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles,and send away the intruder from the country;and if everlasting peace be impossible between us,let us at all events make a treaty for as long a term as possible,and put off our private differences to another day.In fine,let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us each citizens of a free state,and as such arbiters of our own destiny,able to return good or bad offices^[107]with equal effect;while its rejection will make us dependent on others,and thus not only impotent^[108]to repel an insult, but on the most favourable supposition,friends to our direst enemies,and at feud with our natural friends.”

“For myself,though,as I said at first,the representative of a great city,and able to think less of defending myself than of attacking others,I am prepared to concede something in prevision^[109]of these dangers.I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies,or so blinded by animosity^[110]as to think myself equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command;but I am ready to give up anything in reason.I call upon the rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own free will,without being forced to do so by the enemy.There is no disgrace in connexions giving way to one another,a Dorian to a Dorian,or a Chalcidian to his brethren^[111];above and beyond this we are neighbours,live in the same country,are girt by the same sea,and go by the same name of Sicilians.We shall go to war again,I suppose,when the time comes,and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses;but the foreign invader,if we are wise,will always find us united against him,since the hurt of one is the danger of all;and we shall never,in future,invite into the island either allies or mediators^[112].By so acting we shall at the present moment do for Sicily a double service,ridding her at once of the Athenians,and of civil war,and in future shall live in freedom at home,and be less menaced from abroad.”

Such were the words of Hermocrates.The Sicilians took his advice,and came to an understanding among themselves to end the war,each keeping what they had—the Camarinans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to be paid to the Syracusans—and the allies of the Athenians called the officers in command,and told them that they were going to make peace and that they would be included in the treaty.The generals assenting,the peace was concluded,and the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed away from Sicily.

The Melian Dialogue

It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War,but for the last six years the two great feuding empires headed by Athens and Sparta(Lacedaemon^[113])had avoided open hostile action against each other.Ten years into the War,they had signed a treaty of peace and friendship;however,this treaty did not dissipate^[114]the distrust that existed between them.Each feared the others’hegemonic^[115]designs on the Peloponnese^[116]and sought to increase its power to thwart the other’s ambitions. Without openly attacking the other,each used persuasion,coercion,and subversion to strengthen itself and weaken its rival.This struggle for hegemony by Athens and Sparta was felt most acutely by small,hitherto“independent”states who were now being forced to take sides in the bipolar Greek world of the fifth century B.C.One such state was Melos^[117].

Despite being one of the few island colonies of Sparta,Melos had remained neutral in the struggle between Sparta and Athens.Its neutrality,however,was unacceptable to the Athenians,who,accompanied by overwhelming military and naval power,arrived in Melos to pressure it into submission.After strategically positioning their powerful fleets,the Athenian generals sent envoys to Melos to negotiate the island’s surrender.

The commissioners of Melos agreed to meet the envoys in private.They were afraid the Athenians,known for their rhetorical skills,might sway the people if allowed a public forum.The envoys came with an offer that if the Melians submitted and became part of the Athenian empire,their people and their possessions would not be harmed.The Melians argued that by the law of nations they had the right to remain neutral,and no nation had the right to attack without provocation^[118].Having been a free state for seven hundred years,they were not ready to give up that freedom.Thucydides,an Athenian historian,captures the exchange between the Melian commissioners and the Athenian envoys:

Melians:“…all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war,if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit,and in the contrary case,slavery.”

Athenians:“…we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede^[119],or are now attacking you because of the wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech that would not be believed;and in return,we hope that you,instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians,although they are colonists,or that you have done us no wrong,will aim at what is feasible,…since you know as well as we do that right,as the world goes,is only in question between equals in power,while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

The Melians pointed out that it was in the interest of all states to respect the laws of nations:“you should not destroy what is our common protection,the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke^[120]what is fair and right…”They reminded the Athenians that a day might come when the Athenians themselves would need such protection.

But the Athenians were not persuaded.To them,Melos’submission was in the interest of their empire,and Melos.

Melians:“And how pray,could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?”

Athenians:“Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst,and we should gain by not destroying you.”

Melians:“So you would not consent to our being neutral,friends instead of enemies,but allies of neither side?”

Athenians:“No;for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness,and your enmity of our power.”

When the Melians asked if that was their“idea of equity,”the Athenians responded:

“As far as right goes…one has as much of it as the other,and if any maintain their independence,it is because they are strong,and that if we do not molest them,it is because we are afraid…”

By subjugating the Melians,the Athenians hoped not only to extend their empire,but also to improve their image and thus their security.To allow the weaker Melians to remain free,according to the Athenians,would reflect negatively on Athenian power.

Aware of their weak position,the Melians hoped that the justice of their cause would gain them the support of the gods,“and what we want in power will be made up by the alliance with the Lacedaemonians who are bound,if only for honor’s sake,to come to the aid of their kindred^[121].”

Athenians:“…Of the gods we believe,and of men we know,that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can.And it is not as if we were the first to make this law,or to act upon it when made:we found it existing before us, and will leave it to exist forever after us;all we do is to make use of it,knowing that you and everybody else having the same power as we have,would do the same as we do.Thus,as far as the gods are concerned,we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage.But…your notion about the Lacedaemonians,which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you,here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly.The Lacedaemonians…are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable^[122]honorable,and what is expedient^[123]just…Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future,and your actual resources are too scanty^[124]as compared to those arrayed against you,for you to come out victorious.You will therefore show great blindness of judgment,unless,after allowing us to retire,you can find some counsel more prudent than this.”

The envoys then left the conference,giving the Melians the opportunity to deliberate on the Athenian offer and decide the best course for them to follow.

The Melians decided to stand by the position they had taken at the conference with the Athenian envoys.They refused to submit,placing their faith in the gods and the Lacedaemonians.Though they asked the Athenians to accept their neutrality and leave Melos,the Athenians started preparations for war.

In the war that ensued^[125]the Melians were soundly defeated.The Lacedaemonian help never materialized and there was no divine intervention^[126].The victorious Athenians showed no mercy,killing all adult Melian males and selling women and children as slaves.Subsequently,Melos was settled by five hundred Athenians and it became an Athenian colony.

思考题

1.According to Hermocrates,what was the best policy for the Sicilian cities?

2.What threats did Athens pose to the whole island of Sicily?

3.How did Hermocrates persuade the cities of Sicily to make compromises?

4.What was the historical background of the Melian Dialogue?

5.Do you think that the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue were humanitarian?