大国的兴衰（一）

5.大国的兴衰　The Rise and Fallof the Great Powers^[127]

本节导读

保罗·肯尼迪，著名历史学家和国际战略学家，曾获牛津大学博士学位，入选英国皇家历史学会；现为美国耶鲁大学历史学教授及国际安全战略研究中心主任，重点研究和讲授当代战略和国际关系，是多所大学的客座研究员和客座教授。肯尼迪著作甚丰，曾撰写和编辑过有关海军史、帝国主义、英德关系、战略和外交等方面的作品，主要包括：The Parliament of Man:The Past,Present,and Future of the United Nations(2006)（《人类议会——联合国的历史、现状与未来》）、From War to Peace:Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century(2000)（《从战争到和平——20世纪改变了的战略局面》）、Preparing for the Twenty-first Century(1993)（《为21世纪而准备》）、The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:Economic Change and Military Conflict from1500 to2000(1987)（《大国的兴衰——1500至2000年的经济变迁与军事冲突》）、Strategy and Diplomacy1870-1945(1983)（《1870至1945年的战略外交》）、The Realities Behind Diplomacy:Background Influences on British External Policy1865-1980(1981)（《外交背后的现实：1865至1980年英国对外政策的背景影响》）、The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism1860-1914(1980)（《1860至1914年英德对抗的兴起》）、The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery(1976）（《英国海上霸权的兴衰》）。

《大国的兴衰》是一部广泛论述国际政治、经济、军事、外交和历史的学术巨著，1987年出版后为作者赢得了世界性声誉。作者以“经济变迁”与“军事冲突”为主要脉络，分析了公元1500年以来诸大国兴亡盛衰、霸权更迭交替的经验教训，强调经济发展是社会发展的基础，经济力量是军事实力的后盾，并指出：大国兴起，起于经济发展和科技进步，以及随之而来的军事强盛和对外扩张；大国衰落，源于国际生产力重心转移以及过度侵略扩张而造成经济基础和国力的削弱。该书最后一章预测了21世纪世界多极格局的到来，并作出论断——美国将走向相对衰落。“美国衰落论”在美国和国际学术界引起巨大反响，时至今日，围绕美国“衰落”和“复兴”的争论伴随着国际政治、经济、军事形势的发展仍持续进行。本文节选自该书的引言部分。

This is a book about national and international power in the“modern”—that is,post-Renaissance—period.It seeks to trace and to explain how the various Great Powers have risen and fallen,relative to each other,over the five centuries since the formation of the“new monarchies^[128]”of western Europe and the beginnings of the transoceanic, global system of states.Inevitably,it concerns itself a great deal with wars,especially those major,drawn-out^[129]conflicts fought by coalitions of Great Powers which had such an impact upon the international order;but it is not strictly a book about military history.It also concerns itself with tracing the changes which have occurred in the global economic balances since 1500;and yet it is not,at least directly,a work of economic history.What it concentrates upon is the interaction between economics and strategy,as each of the leading states in the international system strove to enhance its wealth and its power,to become(or to remain)both rich and strong.

The“military conflict”referred to in the book’s subtitle is therefore always examined in the context of“economic change”.The triumph of any one Great Power in this period,or the collapse of another,has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces;but it has also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state’s productive economic resources in wartime^[130],and,further in the background,of the way in which that state’s economy had been rising or falling,relative to the other leading nations,in the decades preceding the actual conflict.For that reason,how a Great Power’s position steadily alters in peacetime^[131]is as important to this study as how it fights in wartime.

The argument being offered here will receive much more elaborate analysis in the text itself,but can be summarized very briefly:

The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant,principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another.For example,the coming of the longrange gunned sailing ship and the rise of the Atlantic trades after 1500 was not uniformly beneficial to all the states of Europe—it boosted some much more than others.In the same way,the later development of steam power and of the coal and metal resources upon which it relied massively increased the relative power of certain nations,and thereby decreased the relative power of others.Once their productive capacity was enhanced,countries would normally find it easier to sustain the burdens of paying for large-scale armaments in peacetime and of maintaining and supplying large armies and fleets in wartime.It sounds crudely mercantilistic^[132]to express it this way,but wealth is usually needed to underpin^[133]military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth.If,however,too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes,then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term.In the same way,if a state overextends itself strategically—by,say,the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars—it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all—dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline.The history of the rise and later fall of the leading countries in the Great Power system since the advance of western Europe in the sixteenth century—that is,of nations such as Spain, the Netherlands,France,the British Empire,and currently the United States—shows a very significant correlation^[134]over the longer term between productive and revenueraising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other.

The story of“the rise and fall of the Great Powers”which is presented in these chapters may be briefly summarized here.The first chapter sets the scene for all that follows by examining the world around 1500 and by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each of the“power centers”of that time—Ming China^[135];the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim offshoot in India,the Mogul Empire;Muscovy^[136]; Tokugawa Japan;and the cluster of states in west-central Europe.At the beginning of the sixteenth century it was by no means apparent that the last-named region was destined to raise above all the rest.But however imposing and organized some of those oriental empires appeared by comparison with Europe,they all suffered from the consequences of having a centralized authority^[137]which insisted upon a uniformity of belief and practice,not only in official state religion but also in such areas as commercial activities and weapons development.The lack of any such supreme authority in Europe and the warlike rivalries among its various kingdoms and city-states stimulated a constant search for military improvements,which interacted fruitfully with the newer technological and commercial advances that were also being thrown up in this competitive,entrepreneurial environment.Possessing fewer obstacles to change,European societies entered into a constantly upward spiral of economic growth and enhanced military effectiveness which,over time,was to carry them ahead of all other regions of the globe.

While this dynamic of technological change and military competitiveness drove Europe forward in its usual jostling^[138],pluralistic way,there still remained the possibility that one of the contending states might acquire sufficient resources to surpass the others,and then to dominate the continent.For about 150 years after 1500,a dynastic-religious bloc under the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs^[139]seemed to threaten to do just that,and the efforts of the other major European states to check^[140]this“Habsburg bid for mastery”occupy the whole of Chapter 2. As is done throughout this book,the strengths and weaknesses of each of the leading Powers are analyzed relatively,and in the light of the broader economic and technological changes affecting western society as a whole,in order that the reader can understand better the outcome of the many wars of this period.The chief theme of this chapter is that despite the great resources possessed by the Habsburg monarchs,they steadily overextended themselves in the course of repeated conflicts and became militarily top-heavy^[141]for their weakening economic base.If the other European Great Powers also suffered immensely in these prolonged wars,they managed—though narrowly—to maintain the balance between their material resources and their military power better than their Habsburg enemies.

The Great Power struggles which took place between 1660 and 1815,and are covered in Chapter 3,cannot be so easily summarized as a contest between one large bloc and its many rivals.It was in this complicated period that while certain former Great Powers like Spain and the Netherlands were falling into the second rank, there steadily emerged five major states(France,Britain,Russia,Austria,and Prussia)which came to dominate the diplomacy and warfare of eighteenth-century Europe,and to engage in a series of lengthy coalition wars punctuated^[142]by swiftly changing alliances.This was an age in which France,first under Louis XIV^[143]and then later under Napoleon,came closer to controlling Europe than at any time before or since;but its endeavors were always held in check,in the last resort at least,by a combination of the other Great Powers.Since the cost of standing armies and national fleets had become horrendously great by the early eighteenth century,a country which could create an advanced system of banking and credit(as Britain did)enjoyed many advantages over financially backward rivals.But the factor of geographical position was also of great importance in deciding the fate of the Powers in their many,and frequently changing,contests—which helps to explain why the two“flank^[144]”nations of Russia and Britain had become much more important by 1815.Both retained the capacity to intervene in the struggles of west-central Europe while being geographically sheltered from them;and both expanded into the extra-European world as the eighteenth century unfolded,even as they were ensuring that the continental balance of power was upheld.Finally,by the later decades of the century,the Industrial Revolution was under way in Britain,which was to give that state an enhanced capacity both to colonize overseas and to frustrate the Napoleonic bid for European mastery.

For an entire century after 1815,by contrast,there was a remarkable absence of lengthy coalition wars.A strategic equilibrium^[145]existed,supported by all of the leading Powers in the Concert of Europe,so that no single nation was either able or willing to make a bid for dominance.The prime concerns of government in these post-1815 decades were with domestic instability and(in the case of Russia and the United States)with further expansion across their continental landmasses.This relatively stable international scene allowed the British Empire to rise to its zenith^[146]as a global power,in naval and colonial and commercial terms,and also interacted favorably with its virtual monopoly of steam-driven industrial production.By the second half of the nineteenth century,however,industrialization was spreading to certain other regions,and was beginning to tilt^[147]the international power balances away from the older leading nations and toward those countries with both the resources and organization to exploit the newer means of production and technology. Already,the few major conflicts of this era—the Crimean War^[148]to some degree but more especially the American Civil War^[149]and the Franco-Prussian War^[150]—were bringing defeat upon those societies which failed to modernize their military systems,and which lacked the broad-based industrial infrastructure to support the vast armies and much more expensive and complicated weaponry now transforming the nature of war.

As the twentieth century approached,therefore,the pace of technological change and uneven growth rates made the international system much more unstable and complex than it had been fifty years earlier.This was manifested in the frantic post-1880 jostling by the Great Powers for additional colonial territories in Africa,Asia,and the Pacific,partly for gain,partly out of a fear of being eclipsed.It also manifested itself in the increasing number of arms races,both on land and at sea,and in the creation of fixed military alliances,even in peacetime, as the various governments sought out partners for a possible future war.Behind the frequent colonial quarrels and international crises of the pre-1914 period, however,the decade-by-decade indices of economic power were pointing to even more fundamental shifts in the global balances—indeed,to the eclipse of what had been,for over three centuries,essentially a Eurocentric^[151]world system.Despite their best efforts,traditional European Great Powers like France and Austria-Hungary,and a recently united one like Italy,were falling out of the race.By contrast,the enormous,continent-wide states of the United States and Russia were moving to the forefront,and this despite the inefficiencies of the czarist^[152]state.Among the western European nations only Germany,possibly,had the muscle to force its way into the select league of the future world Powers.Japan,on the other hand,was intent upon being dominant in East Asia,but not farther afield.Inevitably,then,all these changes posed considerable,and ultimately insuperable^[153],problems for a British Empire which now found it much more difficult to defend its global interests than it had a half-century earlier.

Although the major development of the fifty years after 1900 can thus be seen as the coming of a bipolar world,with its consequent crisis for the“middle”Powers（as referred in the titles of Chapters 5 and 6）,this metamorphosis^[154]of the entire system was by no means a smooth one.On the contrary,the grinding,bloody mass battles of the First World War,by placing a premium upon industrial organization and national efficiency,gave imperial Germany certain advantages over the swiftly modernizing but still backward czarist Russia.Within a few months of Germany’s victory on the eastern front,however,it found itself facing defeat in the west,while its allies were similarly collapsing in the Italian,Balkan^[155],and Near Eastern theaters of the war.Because of the late addition of American military and especially economic aid,the western alliance finally had the resources to prevail over its rival coalition.But it had been an exhausting struggle for all the original belligerents^[156]. Austria-Hungary was gone,Russia in revolution,Germany defeated;yet France,Italy,and even Britain itself had also suffered heavily in their victory.The only exceptions were Japan,which further augmented its position in the Pacific;and,of course,the United States,which by 1918 was indisputably the strongest Power in the world.

The swift post-1919 American withdrawal from foreign engagements,and the parallel Russian isolationism^[157]under the Bolshevik^[158]regime,left an international system which was more out of joint with the fundamental economic realities than perhaps at any time in the five centuries covered in this book.Britain and France, although weakened,were still at the center of the diplomatic stage,but by the 1930s their position was being challenged by the militarized,revisionist states of Italy,Japan,and Germany—the last intent upon a much more deliberate bid for European hegemony than even in 1914.In the background,however,the United States remained by far the mightiest manufacturing nation in the world,and Stalin’s Russia was quickly transforming itself into an industrial superpower.Consequently,the dilemma for the revisionist“middle”Powers was that they had to expand soon if they were not to be overshadowed by the two continental giants.The dilemma for the status quo middle Powers was that in fighting off the German and Japanese challenges,they would most likely weaken themselves as well.The Second World War,for all its ups and downs,essentially confirmed those apprehensions of decline.Despite spectacular early victories,the Axis nations^[159]could not in the end succeed against an imbalance of productive resources which was far greater than that of the 1914-1918 war.What they did achieve was the eclipse of France and the irretrievable^[160]weakening of Britain—before they themselves were overwhelmed by superior force.By 1943,the bipolar world forecast decades earlier had finally arrived,and the military balance had once again caught up with the global distribution of economic resources.

The last two chapters of this book examine the years in which a bipolar world did indeed seem to exist,economically,militarily,and ideologically—and was reflected at the political level by the many crises of the Cold War.The position of the United States and the USSR^[161]as Powers in a class of their own also appeared to be reinforced by the arrival of nuclear weapons and long-distance delivery systems, which suggested that the strategic as well as the diplomatic landscape was now entirely different from that of 1900,let alone 1800.

And yet the process of rise and fall among the Great Powers—of differentials in growth rates and technological change,leading to shifts in the global economic balances,which in turn gradually impinge upon the political and military balances—had not ceased.Militarily,the United States and the USSR stayed in the forefront as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s and 1980s.Indeed,because they both interpreted international problems in bipolar,and often Manichean^[162],terms,their rivalry has driven them into an ever-escalating arms race which no other Powers feel capable of matching.Over the same few decades,however,the global productive balances have been altering faster than ever before.The Third World’s share of total manufacturing output and GNP,depressed to an all-time low in the decade after 1945,has steadily expanded since that time.Europe has recovered from its wartime batterings and,in the form of the European Economic Community^[163],has become the world’s largest trading unit.The People’s Republic of China is leaping forward at an impressive rate.Japan’s postwar economic growth has been so phenomenal^[164]that,according to some measures,it recently overtook Russia in total GNP.By contrast,both the American and Russian growth rates have become more sluggish^[165], and their shares of global production and wealth have shrunk dramatically since the 1960s.Leaving aside all the smaller nations,therefore,it is plain that there already exists a multi polar world once more,if one measures the economic indices alone. Given this book’s concern with the interaction between strategy and economics,it seemed appropriate to offer a final(if necessarily speculative)chapter to explore the present disjuncture between the military balances and the productive balances among the Great Powers;and to point to the problems and opportunities facing today’s five large politico-economic“power centers”—China,Japan,the EEC,the Soviet Union,and the United States itself—as they grapple with the age-old task of relating national means to national ends.The history of the rise and fall of the Great Powers has in no way come to a full stop.

思考题

1.How did military conflict and economic change relate to the rise and fall of the Great Powers?

2.Why do the relative strengths of leading nations in world affairs never remain constant?

3.According to the author,why was Europe“destined”to rise above all other regions of the world?

4.Why wasn’t the transition to a bipolar world in the 20th century a smooth one?

5.On what basis does the author argue that economically there already exists a multipolar world in the last few decades of the 20th century?

【注释】

[1]From Marc Trachtenberg,The Craft of International History:A Guide to Method，Princeton University Press,2006，pp.30-46。

[2]conceptual,概念上的。

[3]literature,文献。

[4]illustrate,说明、举例说明。

[5]empirical,以经验为根据的，经验主义的。

[6]Kenneth Waltz,肯尼思·华尔兹，美国著名国际关系理论家，主要著作有《人、国家与战争》（1959年）、《对外政策与民主政治》（1967年）、《国际政治理论》（1979年）。

[7]Prussian,普鲁士的。

[8]Hardenberg,哈登堡侯爵（1750—1822年），多次出任普鲁士首相，1807年《提尔西特和约》签订后，主持普鲁士的改革。

[9]plausible,看似真实的、看似有道理的。

[10]bellicose,好战的、好斗的。

[11]frivolous,轻率的、妄动的。

[12]positivist,实证主义者。

[13]problematic,成问题的、有疑问的。

[14]stylized,程式化的、按固定格式的。

[15]Norwood Hanson,汉森（1924—1967年），美国科学哲学家。

[16]economic man,西方古典经济学中的“经济人”假设，认为人具有完全的理性，可以作出让自己利益最大化的选择。

[17]falsify,宣告或证明为假，证伪。

[18]Imre Lakatos,拉卡托斯（1922—1974年），著名数学哲学家和科学哲学家，当代西方科学哲学“历史学派”主要代表人物之一。

[19]hypothesis,假设、假说。

[20]tautological,同义反复的、类语叠用的。

[21]sensibility,感性、敏感性。

[22]abstract,抽象的、理论的。

[23]meta-,超越的、更高级的、更为广泛的。

[24]bipolar,两极的。

[25]multipolar,多极的。

[26]adventurous,喜欢冒险的。

[27]prelude,前奏、序幕。

[28]Julycrisis,七月危机，从1914年6月28日萨拉热窝事件发生到7月28日奥匈帝国向塞尔维亚宣战，这段时间在外交史上被称为“七月危机”。

[29]From Clive Ponting,World History:A New Perspective,Pimlico,2001，pp.6-9.

[30]Eurocentrism,“欧洲中心论”、“欧洲中心主义”，以欧洲或视欧洲为世界中心的观念或行为。

[31]embodiment,体现、具体化。

[32]Mesopotamia,美索不达米亚，古代西南亚一地区，位于现在的伊拉克境内，孕育了众多的人类早期文明。

[33]Indus valley,印度河谷。

[34]CE,Common Era,公元，相当于AD（Anno Domini），是世俗化的纪年法，相对应的“公元前”为BCE。

[35]periphery,边缘区，世界体系理论将16世纪以来的世界划分为“核心－半边缘（semi-periphery）－边缘”国家组成的三个同心圆。

[36]elite,精英、社会中坚分子。

[37]primitive,原始的、简单的。

[38]Levant,黎凡特，地中海东部自土耳其至埃及地区。

[39]Crete,克里特岛，希腊东南沿海的一个岛屿，位于地中海东部，它的迈诺斯文明是世界上最早的文明之一。

[40]Iberian peninsula,伊比利亚半岛。

[41]nomadic,游牧的。

[42]tribute,贡品、贡物。

[43]constrict,压缩、使收缩。

[44]Anatolia,安纳托利亚，土耳其的亚洲部分，一般认为等同于小亚细亚。

[45]pilgrim,朝拜者、朝圣者。

[46]Ottoman,土耳其人、奥斯曼人。

[47]Safavid,伊朗萨非王朝时期的人。

[48]Mughal,印度莫卧儿王朝时期的人。

[49]transcend,超越、胜过。

[50]Jürchen,女真族人。

[51]Mongol,蒙古族人。

[52]offshoot,分支、旁支。

[53]From Joshua S.Goldstein,International Relations,Sixth Edition,Pearson Longman,2005,pp.24-29.

[54]subsume,把……归入、包括、包含。

[55]indigenous,本土的。

[56]exterminate,消除、灭绝、根除。

[57]exemplify,作为……例子。

[58]Thucydides,修昔底德（约公元前460—前396年），古代希腊杰出的历史学家，著有《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》。

[59]Athens,雅典。

[60]Sparta,斯巴达，伯罗奔尼撒半岛东南部古希腊的一个城邦。

[61]Alexander the Great,亚历山大大帝（公元前356—前323年），马其顿王国国王（公元前336—前323年），军事统帅。

[62]The Art of War,《孙子兵法》。

[63]Shogun,日本幕府时代的将军。

[64]Tokugawa shogunate,德川幕府。

[65]Meiji restoration,明治维新。

[66]Mayans,玛雅人，古代生活在墨西哥南部和中美洲北部的印第安人的一支。

[67]Aztecs,阿兹特克人，古代墨西哥土著人。

[68]Incas,印加人，古代秘鲁土著人。

[69]Crusades，十字军东征。

[70]pan-Arabism,泛阿拉伯主义。

[71]Islamic fundamentalism,伊斯兰原教旨主义。

[72]Renaissance,文艺复兴。

[73]Niccolò Machiavelli,尼可罗·马基亚维利（1469—1527年），意大利政治哲学家、音乐家、诗人和浪漫喜剧剧作家，《君主论》的作者。

[74]monarch,君主。

[75]Industrial Revolution,工业革命。

[76]chronic,慢性的、长期的。

[77]recurrent,周期性发生的、反复出现的。

[78]Treaty of Westphalia,《威斯特伐利亚和约》。

[79]Hapsburg,哈布斯堡王朝（的）。哈布斯堡家族长期统治神圣罗马帝国。

[80]Thirty Years'War,三十年战争（1618—1648年）。

[81]forerunner,先驱。

[82]Napoleonic Wars,拿破仑战争（1813—1815年）。

[83]Congress of Vienna,维也纳和会1814年9月18日到1815年6月9日之间在奥地利维也纳召开的一次欧洲列强的外交会议，重新构建了拿破仑在拿破仑战争中被打败之后的欧洲政治版图。

[84]Concert of Europe,“欧洲协调”，拿破仑战争结束后欧洲列强以会议的方式协商处理欧洲重大问题的协商外交机制。

[85]precedent,先例。

[86]lull,间歇、平静时期。

[87]adversary,敌手、对手。

[88]bloc,集团。

[89]strain,紧张，导致关系紧张的事例。

[90]From Thucydides,History of the Pelopponesian War,translated by Richard Crawley,Book IV＆V,The Melian Dialogue adapted by Suresht Bald.

[91]Hermocrates,赫摩克拉底，锡拉库萨将军，在伯罗奔尼撒战争的一场关键战役中击败雅典军队的入侵。

[92]Camarina,克玛瑞纳，意大利西西里岛南部港市。

[93]Gela,杰拉，意大利西西里岛南部港市。

[94]pacification,讲和、和解。

[95]Syracusan,锡拉库萨人，锡拉库萨是西西里岛东南部港市。

[96]imperious,紧急的。

[97]Hellas,希腊。

[98]dominion,统治、支配、控制。

[99]subjection,征服、屈服。

[100]internecine,互相残杀的、两败俱伤的、内部冲突的。

[101]Dorian,古希腊多利安人。

[102]Chalcidian,希腊卡尔西迪人。

[103]Ionian,爱奥尼亚的，爱奥尼亚人。

[104]issue in,导致。

[105]dilate on,详述。

[106]effect,实现、达到。

[107](good/bad)offices,帮助。

[108]impotent,无力的、虚弱的。

[109]prevision,先见、预知。

[110]animosity,仇恨、敌意。

[111]brethren,弟兄们、同胞。

[112]mediator,调停者、仲裁人。

[113]Lacedaemon,拉斯第孟，古代斯巴达的别称。

[114]dissipate,驱散。

[115]hegemonic,霸权的。

[116]Peloponnese,希腊南部伯罗奔尼撒半岛。

[117]Melos,弥罗斯，爱琴海中的一个岛屿。

[118]provocation,挑衅。

[119]Mede,米堤亚人，伊朗部族之成员，与波斯人关系很近，居住于古代米堤亚地区。

[120]invoke,援引、援用。

[121]kindred,同族人、同胞，同宗的、同族的。

[122]agreeable,合适的。

[123]expedient,有利的。

[124]scanty,缺乏的、不足的。

[125]ensue,跟着发生、随之发生。

[126]divine intervention,神的干预。

[127]From Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:Economic Change and Military Conflict from1500 to2000,New York:Random House,1987，Introduction:xv-xxi.

[128]monarchy,君主国、君主政体。

[129]drawn-out,持续很久的。

[130]wartime,战时。

[131]peacetime,和平时期。

[132]mercantilist,重商主义的。

[133]underpin,巩固、支撑。

[134]correlation,相关性。

[135]MingChina,中国明朝。

[136]Muscovy,莫斯科公国。

[137]centralized authority,中央集权。

[138]jostling,推挤的、互相争夺的。

[139]Habsburg,=Hapsburg,哈布斯堡。

[140]check,抑制、遏制。

[141]top-heavy,头重脚轻的。

[142]punctuate,不时打断。

[143]Louis XIV,法国国王路易十四（1638—1715年），1643—1715年在位。

[144]flank,侧面。

[145]equilibrium,平衡。

[146]zenith,顶点、顶峰、最高点。

[147]tilt,使倾斜、翘起。

[148]Crimean War,克里米亚战争，1854—1856年英法联军和俄国为争夺黑海霸权而展开的一场战争。

[149]American Civil War,美国内战（1861—1865年）。

[150]Franco-Prussian War,普法战争（1870—1871年）。

[151]Eurocentric,以欧洲为中心的。

[152]Czarist,沙皇或沙皇制度的。

[153]insuperable,不能克服的。

[154]metamorphosis,变形。

[155]Balkan,巴尔干半岛的。

[156]belligerent,交战方。

[157]isolationism,孤立主义。

[158]Bolshevik,布尔什维克。

[159]Axis nations,（德、意、日三国组成的）轴心国。

[160]irretrievable,不能挽回的、不能复原的。

[161]USSR,苏联，全称为Union of Soviet Socialist Republics。

[162]Manichean,摩尼教的。

[163]European Economic Community,欧洲经济共同体（EEC）。

[164]phenomenal,显著的、非凡的。

[165]sluggish,迟缓的、缺少活力的。