无政府状态与权力政治的社会建构

5.无政府状态与权力政治的社会建构　Anarchy and the Social Construction of Power Politics^[189]

本节导读

亚历山大·温特，国际关系建构主义学派的主要代表人物。建构主义又称社会建构主义，于20世纪80年代中后期兴起，80年代末90年代初开始成形并受到学界重视，时至今日已发展成在国际关系理论界中有着重要影响力的学派。与结构现实主义和新自由主义不同的是，建构主义借用社会学的观点和概念，强调了观念、认同、文化等因素的重要性，并将其用于分析和解释国际关系现象。建构主义指出，人、组织或国家的行为都是社会建构的，并不遵循一个不变的秩序或原理。该学派较有影响力的学者有亚历山大·温特、奥努弗（Nicholas Onuf）、芬尼摩尔（Martha Finnemore）、卡赞斯坦（Peter J.Katzenstein）等。

温特对建构主义学派的发展和壮大起到了关键作用。温特于1987年在《国际组织》上发表论文《国际关系理论中的施动者结构问题》（The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory），开始探讨国际政治的社会因素。1992年，发表论文《无政府状态是国家建构造就的：权力政治的社会建构》（AnarchyIs What States Make of It:the Social Construction of Power Politics），为建构主义学说奠定了基石。1999年，出版专著《国际政治的社会理论》（Social Theory of International Politics），全面阐述了社会建构理论，该书被认为是20世纪国际关系学最后一本最重要的著作。

下文节选自AnarchyIs What States Make ofIt:the Social Construction of Power Politics。题目并非表示无政府状态是国家的活动造成的一种“结果”——无政府状态本身就是一种“存在”，其中更多地强调国家如何认识、对待无政府状态问题。作者在《国际政治的社会理论》中对“anarchy”作了进一步的解释：“（无政府状态）是一个空的容器，没有内在的意义。使无政府状态产生意义的是居于其中的人以及他们之间的关系结构。”在本节中，温特对国际无政府状态必然产生自助和权力政治的逻辑进行批判：首先使用“认同”和“利益”等概念来论证自助只是在无政府状态下可能存在的体系特征类型之一，然后以“自我”与“他者”互动的假设来解释权力政治是行为体在实践活动中建构产生的，最后引入“掠夺性”国家行为体这一因素来说明自助体系产生和存在的原因。

I argue that self-help^[190]and power politics^[191]do not follow either logically or causally^[192]from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process,not structure.There is no“logic”of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate^[193]one structure of identities and interests rather than another;structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.Selfhelp and power politics are institutions,not essential features of anarchy.Anarchy is what states make of it.

＊＊＊

Anarchy and Power Politics

＊＊＊

I will not here contest the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive,self-help world;I will only dispute its explanation.I develop my argument in three stages.First,I disentangle the concepts of self-help and anarchy by showing that self-interested conceptions of security are not a constitutive^[194]property of anarchy.Second,I show how self-help and competitive power politics may be produced causally by processes of interaction between states in which anarchy plays only a permissive^[195]role.In both of these stages of my argument,I selfconsciously bracket the first-and second-image^[196]determinants of state identity,not because they are unimportant(they are indeed important),but because like Waltz’s^[197]objective,mine is to clarify the“logic”of anarchy.Third,I reintroduce first-and second-image determinants to assess their effects on identity-formation^[198]in different kinds of anarchies.

Anarchy,self-help,and intersubjective^[199]knowledge

＊＊＊

The question is whether self-help is a logical or contingent feature of anarchy.In this section,I develop the concept of a“structure of identity and interest”and show that no particular one follows logically from anarchy.

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects,including other actors,on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which.U.S.military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba,despite their similar“structural”positions,just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles.The distribution of power may always affect states’calculations,but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations,on the“distribution of knowledge,”that constitute their conceptions of self and other.If society“forgets”what a university is,the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist;if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies,“the cold war is over.”It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions.

Actors acquire identities—relatively stable,role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in such collective meanings.Identities are inherently relational^[200]:“Identity,with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality,is always identity within a specific,socially constructed world,”Peter Berger^[201]argues.Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles,such as brother, son,teacher,and citizen.Similarly,a state may have multiple identities as“sovereign,”“leader of the free world,”“imperial power,”and so on.The commitment to and the salience^[202]of particular identities vary,but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world.

Identities are the basis of interests.Actors do not have a“portfolio”of interests that they carry around independent of social context;instead,they define their interests in the process of defining situations.As Nelson Foote^[203]puts it:“Motivation…refer[s]to the degree to which a human being,as a participant in the ongoing social process in which he necessarily finds himself,defines a problematic situation as calling for the performance of a particular act,with more or less anticipated consummations and consequences,and thereby his organism releases the energy appropriate to performing it.”Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience,and in these cases we have to construct their meaning,and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them de novo^[204].More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis of institutionally defined roles.When we say that professors have an“interest”in teaching,research,or going on leave,we are saying that to function in the role identity of“professor,”they have to define certain situations as calling for certain actions.This does not mean that they will necessarily do so(expectations and competence do not equal performance),but if they do not,they will not get tenure.The absence or failure of roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult,and identity confusion may result.This seems to be happening today in the United States and the former Soviet Union:without the cold war’s mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their identities, these states seem unsure of what their“interests”should be.

An institution is a relatively stable set or“structure”of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms,but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors’socialization to and participation in collective knowledge.Institutions are fundamentally cognitive^[205]entities that do not exist apart from actors’ideas about how the world works.This does not mean that institutions are not real or objective,that they are“nothing but”beliefs.As collective knowledge,they are experienced as having an existence“over and above the individuals who happen to embody them at the moment.”In this way,institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts,but they are still a function of what actors collectively“know.”Identities and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other;they are“mutually constitutive.”On this view,institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior;socialization is a cognitive process,not just a behavioral one.Conceived in this way,institutions may be cooperative or conflictual^[206],a point sometimes lost in scholarship on international regimes,which tends to equate institutions with cooperation.There are important differences between conflictual and cooperative institutions to be sure,but all relatively stable self-other relations—even those of“enemies”—are defined intersubjectively.

Self-help is an institution,one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy.Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or“security”of the self.Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other,and,I want to suggest,it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends.

＊＊＊

On this view,the tendency in international relations scholarship to view power and institutions as two opposing explanations of foreign policy is therefore misleading,since anarchy and the distribution of power only have meaning for state action in virtue of the understandings and expectations that constitute institutional identities and interests.Self-help is one such institution,constituting one kind of anarchy but not the only kind.

＊＊＊

Anarchy and the social construction of power politics

If self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy,it must emerge causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role.This reflects a second principle of constructivism:that the meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction.

＊＊＊

Conceptions of self and interest tend to“mirror”the practices of significant others over time.This principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the“looking-glass self,”which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.

Consider two actors—ego and alter^[207]—encountering each other for the first time. Each wants to survive and has certain material capabilities,but neither actor has biological or domestic imperatives for power,glory,or conquest(still bracketed), and there is no history of security or insecurity between the two.What should they do?Realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other’s intentions,justifying such an attitude as prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake.Such a possibility always exists,even in civil society;however,society would be impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities.Instead,most decisions are and should be made on the basis of probabilities,and these are produced by interaction,by what actors do.

In the beginning is ego’s gesture,which may consist,for example,of an advance, a retreat,a brandishing^[208]of arms,a laying down of arms,or an attack.For ego,this gesture represents the basis on which it is prepared to respond to alter.This basis is unknown to alter,however,and so it must make an inference or“attribution”about ego’s intentions and,in particular,given that this is anarchy,about whether ego is a threat.The content of this inference will largely depend on two considerations.The first is the gesture’s and ego’s physical qualities,which are in part contrived by ego and which include the direction of movement,noise,numbers,and immediate consequences of the gesture.The second consideration concerns what alter would intend by such qualities were it to make such a gesture itself.Alter may make an attributional“error”in its inference about ego’s intent,but there is also no reason for it to assume a priori^[209]—before the gesture—that ego is threatening,since it is only through a process of signaling and interpreting that the costs and probabilities of being wrong can be determined.Social threats are constructed, not natural.

Consider an example.Would we assume,a priori,that we were about to be attacked if we are ever contacted by members of an alien civilization?I think not. We would be highly alert,of course,but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched an attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security—if only to avoid making an immediate enemy out of what may be a dangerous adversary.The possibility of error,in other words,does not force us to act on the assumption that the aliens are threatening:action depends on the probabilities we assign,and these are in key part a function of what the aliens do;prior to their gesture,we have no systemic basis for assigning probabilities.If their first gesture is to appear with a thousand spaceships and destroy New York,we will define the situation as threatening and respond accordingly.But if they appear with one spaceship,saying what seems to be“we come in peace,”we will feel“reassured”and will probably respond with a gesture intended to reassure them,even if this gesture is not necessarily interpreted by them as such.

This process of signaling,interpreting,and responding completes a“social act”and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings.It advances the same way.The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other’s future behavior:potentially mistaken and certainly tentative,but expectations nonetheless. Based on this tentative knowledge,ego makes a new gesture,again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter,and again alter responds,adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other,and so on over time.The mechanism here is reinforcement;interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others.If repeated long enough,these“reciprocal typifications^[210]”will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction.

It is through reciprocal interaction,in other words,that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.Jeff Coulter^[211]sums up the ontological^[212]dependence of structure on process this way:“The parameters of social organization themselves are reproduced only in and through the orientations and practices of members engaged in social interactions over time…Social configurations are not‘objective’like mountains or forests,but neither are they‘subjective’like dreams or flights of speculative fancy. They are,as most social scientists concede at the theoretical level,intersubjective constructions.”

The simple overall model of identity-and interest-formation proposed in Figure 1 applies to competitive institutions no less than to cooperative ones.Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels are threatening to the self,creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted.Competitive or egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity; if the other is threatening,the self is forced to“mirror”such behavior in its conception of the self’s relationship to that other.Being treated as an object for the gratification of others precludes the positive identification with others necessary for collective security;conversely,being treated by others in ways that are empathic^[213]with respect to the security of the self permits such identification.

Competitive systems of interaction are prone to security“dilemmas,”in which the efforts of actors to enhance their security unilaterally threaten the security of the others,perpetuating distrust and alienation.The forms of identity and interest that constitute such dilemmas,however,are themselves ongoing effects of,not exogenous^[214]to,the interaction;identities are produced in and through“situated activity.”We do not begin our relationship with the aliens in a security dilemma;security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature.Of course,once institutionalized such a dilemma may be hard to change(I return to this below),but the point remains:identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings that are always in process.As Sheldon Stryker^[215]emphasizes,“The social process is one of constructing and reconstructing self and social relationships.”If states find themselves in a self-help system,this is because their practices made it that way.Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.

Predator^[216]states and anarchy as permissive cause

The mirror theory of identity-formation is a crude account of how the process of creating identities and interests might work,but it does not tell us why a system of states—such as,arguably,our own—would have ended up with self-regarding and not collective identities.In this section,I examine an efficient cause^[217],predation, which,in conjunction with anarchy as a permissive cause,may generate a self-help system.In so doing,however,I show the key role that the structure of identities and interests plays in mediating anarchy’s explanatory role.

The predator argument is straightforward and compelling.For whatever reasons—biology,domestic politics,or systemic victimization^[218]—some states may become predisposed^[219]toward aggression.The aggressive behavior of these predators or“bad apples”forces other states to engage in competitive power politics,to meet fire with fire,since failure to do so may degrade or destroy them.One predator will best a hundred pacifists because anarchy provides no guarantees.This argument is powerful in part because it is so weak:rather than making the strong assumption that all states are inherently power-seeking(a purely reductionist^[220]theory of power politics),it assumes that just one is power-seeking and that the others have to follow suit because anarchy permits the one to exploit them.

In making this argument,it is important to reiterate that the possibility of predation does not in itself force states to anticipate it a priori with competitive power politics of their own.The possibility of predation does not mean that“war may at any moment occur”;it may in fact be extremely unlikely.Once a predator emerges,however,it may condition^[221]identity-and interest-formation in the following manner.

In an anarchy of two,if ego is predatory,alter must either define its security in self-help terms or pay the price.This follows directly from the above argument,in which conceptions of self mirror treatment by the other.In an anarchy of many,however,the effect of predation also depends on the level of collective identity already attained in the system.If predation occurs right after the first encounter in the state of nature,it will force others with whom it comes in contact to defend themselves, first individually and then collectively if they come to perceive a common threat.The emergence of such a defensive alliance will be seriously inhibited if the structure of identities and interests has already evolved into a Hobbesian world of maximum insecurity,since potential allies will strongly distrust each other and face intense collective action problems;such insecure allies are also more likely to fall out^[222]amongst themselves once the predator is removed.If collective security identity is high,however,the emergence of a predator may do much less damage.If the predator attacks any member of the collective,the latter will come to the victim’s defense on the principle of“all for one,one for all,”even if the predator is not presently a threat to other members of the collective.If the predator is not strong enough to withstand the collective,it will be defeated and collective security will obtain.But if it is strong enough,the logic of the two-actor case(now predator and collective)will activate,and balance-of-power politics will reestablish itself.

The timing of the emergence of predation relative to the history of identity-formation in the community is therefore crucial to anarchy’s explanatory role as a permissive cause.Predation will always lead victims to defend themselves,but whether defense will be collective or not depends on the history of interaction within the potential collective as much as on the ambitions of the predator.Will the disappearance of the Soviet threat renew old insecurities among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?Perhaps,but not if they have reasons independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another.Identities and interests are relationship-specific,not intrinsic attributes of a“portfolio”;states may be competitive in some relationships and solidary in others.“Mature”anarchies are less likely than“immature”ones to be reduced by predation to a Hobbesian condition,and maturity,which is a proxy for structures of identity and interest,is a function of process.

The source of predation also matters.If it stems from unit-level^[223]causes that are immune to systemic impacts(causes such as human nature or domestic politics taken in isolation),then it functions in a manner analogous^[224]to a“genetic trait”in the constructed world of the state system.Even if successful,this trait does not select for other predators in an evolutionary sense so much as it teaches other states to respond in kind,but since traits cannot be unlearned,the other states will continue competitive behavior until the predator is either destroyed or transformed from within.However,in the more likely event that predation stems at least in part from prior systemic interaction—perhaps as a result of being victimized in the past(one thinks here of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union)—then it is more a response to a learned identity and,as such,might be transformed by future social interaction in the form of appeasement^[225],reassurances that security needs will be met,systemic effects on domestic politics,and so on.In this case,in other words,there is more hope that process can transform a bad apple into a good one.

The role of predation in generating a self-help system,then,is consistent with a systematic focus on process.Even if the source of predation is entirely exogenous to the system,it is what states do that determines the quality of their interactions under anarchy.

思考题

1.In what stages does the author develop his argument that power politics is socially constructed?

2.How does the author argue that self-help and power politics are not constitutive features of anarchy?

3.What does the author mean by an“institution”?

4.How does the author explain that self-help might arise under anarchy?

5.What roles does predation play in generating a self-help system among states under anarchy according to the author?

【注释】

[1]From Stephen M.Walt,“International Relations:One World,Many Theories”,Foreign Policy,No.110,(Spring,1998),pp.29-32，34-46.

[2]diverse,多种多样的、形形色色的。

[3]orthodoxy,正统。

[4]heterogeneity,多种多样。

[5]propensity,倾向、习性。

[6]mitigate,减轻、缓和。

[7]Hans Morgenthau,汉斯·摩根索（1904—1980年），美国政治学家、古典现实主义大师、国际法学中的“权力政治学派”缔造者，代表作《国家间政治——权力斗争与和平》。

[8]Reinhold Niebuhr,雷茵霍尔德·尼布尔（1892—1971年），20世纪美国著名神学家、思想家，最知名的工作是尝试将基督信仰和现代政治外交联系起来，著有《道德的人与不道德的社会》、《人的本性与命运》等。

[9]innate,先天的、天生的。

[10]anarchic,无政府的、无政府主义的。

[11]offense-defense theory,进攻—防御理论，下文提到的杰维斯、奎斯特、埃弗拉均是该理论的主要提倡者。

[12]posture,姿势、立场。

[13]squander,浪费。

[14]strand,（由许多线索组成的材料中的）一股、一束、一缕。

[15]interdependence,互相依赖。

[16]Woodrow Wilson,伍德罗·威尔逊，美国第二十八任总统，被认为是美国历史上学术成就最高的一位总统，其理想主义政治理念影响深远。

[17]forego,放弃。

[18]encroach,侵占、蚕食。

[19]pervasive,遍布的、普遍的。

[20]incessant,不断的、不停的。

[21]dependency theory,依附理论，20世纪五六十年代出现的一种以拉美学者为主的学术潮流，是解释第三世界不发达状态成因的多种理论的总称。

[22]parasitic,寄生的。

[23]schism,分裂、不合。

[24]mantle,“衣钵”。

[25]deconstructionist,解构主义的。

[26]Graham Allison,格雷厄姆·艾利森，美国哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院教授，对危机决策颇有研究，代表作为《决策的本质：解释古巴导弹危机》等。

[27]John Steinbruner,约翰·斯坦布鲁纳，美国马里兰大学国际安全与研究中心主任，对安全政策、军备控制等均有深入研究。

[28]Irving Janis,欧文·贾尼斯（1918—1990年），美国心理学家，致力于政策制定的心理学分析、危机管理等方面的研究，因提出“团体迷思”（Groupthink）理论而闻名。

[29]cognitive psychology,认知心理学。

[30]redux,回来的、回归的。

[31]Joseph Grieco,约瑟夫·格里科，政治学教授，认为国家对相对收益的关注会阻碍国家间合作,从而使国际制度的作用受到限制。

[32]Stephen Krasner,史蒂芬·克拉斯纳，美国斯坦福大学国际关系教授，以其对国家主权等的深入研究而著名，其代表作《主权：组织性伪善》（Sovereignty:Organized Hypocrisy）系统地阐述了有关主权问题的观点。

[33]jeopardize,危害。

[34]Jack Snyder,杰克·斯奈德，美国哥伦比亚大学教授，被公认为著名的大国战略学者之一。

[35]John Mearsheimer,约翰·米尔斯海默，美国芝加哥大学政治学教授，美国国际关系领域中的杰出学者之一，代表作为《大国政治的悲剧》。

[36]Francis Fukuyama,弗朗西斯·福山，日裔美籍学者，现为约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究院国际政治经济教授及国际发展项目主任，其1992年出版的《历史的终结和最后的人》被翻译成多国文字。

[37]Michael W.Doyle,迈克尔·多伊尔，国际关系著名学者，尤以对“民主和平论”的论证而著名，代表作为《自由主义和世界政治》等。

[38]espouse,支持、赞成。

[39]qualifier,限定条件。

[40]dearth,缺乏。

[41]Robert Keohane,罗伯特·基欧汉，新自由制度主义的主要奠基人，代表作为《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与冲突》，并与约瑟夫·奈合著《权力与相互依赖》。

[42]substantive,独立存在的。

[43]supersede,代替，取代。

[44]pundit,学者，评论家。

[45]malleable,有延展性的，可塑的。

[46]Mikhail Gorbachev,米哈伊尔·谢尔盖耶维奇·戈尔巴乔夫，（1931—），政论家、国务活动家，最后一位苏联共产党中央总书记（1985—1991年），第一位也是最后一位苏联总统（1990—1991年），苏联的“公开化”的创始人，1990年诺贝尔和平奖获得者。

[47]salient,显著的、突出的。

[48]Alexander Wendt,亚历山大·温特，建构主义代表人物，代表作为《国际政治的社会理论》。

[49]suboptimal,未达最佳标准的、不最理想的。

[50]prospect theory,前景理论。

[51]variable,变数、变量。

[52]eschew,避开、回避。

[53]Samuel Huntington,塞缪尔·亨廷顿（1927—2008年），美国当代著名的国际政治理论家，其《文明冲突和世界秩序重建》一书系统地提出了“文明冲突论”。

[54]upsurge,急剧上升、高涨。

[55]convergence,汇聚、集中。

[56]compleat,博学的、有造诣的。

[57]cognizant,认识的、知晓的。

[58]Hans J.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace,Sixth Edition,Revised, New York:McGraw-Hill,1985,pp.4-17.

[59]impervious to,不受……影响的。

[60]divorced from,与……脱离的。

[61]wishful thinking,一厢情愿的想法。

[62]novelty,新颖、新奇。

[63]obsolete,过时的、陈旧的。

[64]fad,流行一时的狂热，时尚，风气。

[65]tantamount to,相当于。

[66]surmise,猜测。

[67]signpost,路标。

[68]aesthetics,美学。

[69]bear out,证实，证明是正确的或理所当然的。

[70]disinterested，无私的，无利益关系的。

[71]continuity,连续性、连贯性。

[72]continuum,连续统一体。

[73]contingent,偶然的、可能发生的。

[74]whim,一时的兴致、突然的念头。

[75]psychopathology,精神变态、精神病理学。

[76]replete,充满的。

[77]precept,规范、原则。

[78]indiscriminate,不加选择的、不加区别的。

[79]invalidate,使无效。

[80]Robert Salisbury,索尔兹伯里（1830—1903年），英国保守党领袖，三任英国首相（1885—1886年，1886—1892年，1895—1902年），以其在非洲扩张政策而知名。

[81]Max Weber,马克斯·韦伯（1864—1920年），德国政治经济学家和社会学家，被公认为现代社会学和公共行政学最重要的创始人之一。

[82]gamut,整个范围，全音阶。

[83]untamed,未驯服的、难控驭的。

[84]perennial,长期的。

[85]pluralistic,多元化的。

[86]The Federalist papers，《联邦党人文集》。1787—1788年，亚历山大·汉密尔顿、约翰·杰伊和詹姆斯·麦迪逊三人为争取批准新宪法，在纽约报刊上共以“普布利乌斯”（Publius）为笔名而发表的一系列的论文文集。

[87]fmilitate against,妨碍,对……产生不利影响。

[88]ineluctable,不可避免的、无法逃避的。

[89]gloss over,掩盖。

[90]exacting,严格的。

[91]disapprobation,不赞成、持反对意见。

[92]idolatry,偶像崇拜，过度崇拜。

[93]inscrutable,难以理解的、不能预测的。

[94]blasphemous,亵渎神明的。

[95]Providence,上帝，天意。

[96]moderation,节制，克制力。

[97]gainsay,否认。

[98]subordinate,使……服从。

[99]take issue with,与……争论，持不同意见，反对。

[100]legalistic-moralistic approach,法理—道德分析法，这里指理想主义学派倾向于从法理、道德角度来看待问题。

[101]restraint,克制。

[102]disparage,贬损、轻视。

[103]embellish,修饰、美化。

[104]intrinsic,固有的、内在的、本质的。

[105]From Michael W.Doyle,“Liberalism and World Politics”,the American Political Science Review,Vol. 80,No.4.(Dec.,1986),pp.1151-1169.

[106]make for,倾向于，导致，促成。

[107]Immanuel Kant,康德（1724—1805年），德国哲学家，德国古典哲学创始人，被认为是对现代欧洲最具影响力的思想家之一。《论永久和平》（Zumewigen Frieden）是康德的一篇著名论文，阐述其关于国际社会如何保持和平的法哲学理论。

[108]prone to,倾向于……

[109]liberal internationalism,自由主义的国际主义。

[110]pacifistic,和平主义的。

[111]imperialistic,帝国主义的。

[112]bedevil,困扰。

[113]this side the grave,人世间，有生之年。

[114]adjacent,邻近的、毗连的。

[115]pluralistic,多元化的。

[116]imprudence,不谨慎，轻率行为。

[117]Mussolini,墨索里尼（1883—1945年），意大利法西斯党首领及独裁者，掌权期从1922年至1945年。

[118]expansionist,扩张主义的。

[119]geostrategic,地缘战略的。

[120]waxand wane,（月）盈亏圆缺，盛衰。

[121]definitive articles,“正式条款”,《论永久和平》中还提出关于各个国家之间的永久和平的六条“预备条款”（preliminaryarticles）。

[122]backslide,倒退。

[123]subservience,屈从、从属。

[124]nonaggression,不侵犯。

[125]collective security,集体安全。

[126]cosmopolitan,全世界的、世界主义的。

[127]epistemology,认识论。

[128]teleology,目的论。

[129]heuristic,启发式的。

[130]onerous,繁重的、费力的。

[131]come about,发生、产生。

[132]asocial sociability,非社会的社会性。

[133]nondespotic,非专制的。

[134]absolutist,专制主义者、专制主义的。

[135]caprice,反复无常。

[136]laden with,载满、充满……

[137]susceptibility,易受影响。

[138]profess,表示、声称。

[139]amity,友好,亲善关系。

[140]enmity,敌意，敌对关系。

[141]autarky,自给自足。

[142]sour,使变酸，使糟。

[143]reciprocated retaliation,互相报复。

[144]polity,政治体。

[145]anarchy,无政府状态。

[146]From Hedley Bull,the Anarchical Society:a Study of Order in World Politics,3rd Edition,(Palgrave Macmillan,2002),pp.62-71.

[147]in the first instance,首先、起初。

[148]contingent,可能发生的、偶然的。

[149]fortuitously,偶然地。

[150]prescribe,指示、规定。

[151]vacuous,无意义的、空洞的。

[152]sectional,地区的、区域性的。

[153]instrumental,有帮助的、有作用的。

[154]reciprocal,相互的。

[155]operational,操作的、行为的。

[156]established practice,成规、惯例。

[157]flux,不断变动。

[158]complex,复合体。

[159]state,声明、陈述。

[160]Hobbesian,霍布斯式的，“自然状态”（state of nature）下所有人对所有人（everyman against every man）的。

[161]sacrosanct,极神圣的。

[162]presuppose,是……的先决条件。

[163]supra-state,超国家的。

[164]sub-state,次国家的。

[165]wrest from,从……夺取。

[166]rules of coexistence,共存规则。

[167]Covenant of the League of Nations,《国际联盟盟约》。

[168]non-combatant,非战斗人员、平民。

[169]pacta sunt servanda,条约必须遵守。

[170]subordinate or qualifyingrules,从属性或限制性规则。

[171]good faith,信用，真诚，善意。

[172]corollary,必然的结果，推论。

[173]quasi-rules,准规则。

[174]explicit,明确的，表达得完全的和清楚的。

[175]self-determination,自主、自决。

[176]ancillary,辅助性的。

[177]depository states for a treaty,条约保管国。

[178]guarantor,担保人、保证人。

[179]self-help,自助、自救。

[180]legitimise,使合法化。

[181]rescind,废除。

[182]handicap,障碍、阻碍。

[183]displace,取代、置换。

[184]for want of,因缺乏。

[185]nuclear deterrence,核威慑。

[186]dissatisfied,不满的。

[187]surrogate,代理的。

[188]discharge,履行（职责），执行。

[189]From Alexander Wendt,“narchy is What States Make of it:The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization,Vol.46,No.2.(Spring,1992),pp.391-425.

[190]self-help,自助、自救。

[191]power politics,权力政治。

[192]causally,有原因地。

[193]instantiate,是……的实例。

[194]constitutive,构成的、基本的。

[195]permissive,许可的。

[196]Three images,肯尼思·华尔兹在《人、国家与战争》一书中提出，用三个不同的“意象”（个人、国家和国际体系，通常翻译为三种“分析层次”）来解释国际关系行为。

[197]Kenneth Waltz,肯尼思·华尔兹，美国著名国际关系理论家，主要著作有《人、国家与战争》（1959年）、《对外政策与民主政治》（1967年）、《国际政治理论》（1979年）。

[198]identity-formation,身份形成。

[199]intersubjective,主体间的。

[200]relational,相关的、相互关系的。

[201]Peter L.Berger，彼得·伯格（1929—），美国社会学家、路德教神学家，较有影响力的作品有The Social Construction of Reality:A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge(1966)。

[202]salience,明显，突出。

[203]Nelson N.Foote,尼尔森·富特，最先将“身份认同”概念引入社会学研究的学者之一，见其Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation(1951)。

[204]de novo,重新，再次。

[205]cognitive,认知的、认识的。

[206]conflictual,冲突的。

[207]egoand alter,自我与他者（第二自我），alter指的是与ego互动的alter ego，与上文的“镜子”比喻相对应。

[208]brandish,挥舞。

[209]a priori,先验地、推理地。

[210]typification,典型化。

[211]Jeff Coulter,杰夫·库尔特，美国波士顿大学社会学教授。

[212]ontological,存在论的、本体论的。

[213]empathic,移情的，认同和理解别人的处境、感情和动机的。

[214]exogenous,外生的、外源性的。

[215]Sheldon Stryker,谢尔顿·史赛克，美国印第安纳大学社会学荣誉教授。

[216]predator,掠夺者。

[217]efficient cause,近因，直接产生效果的原因。

[218]victimization,受害。

[219]predisposed,倾向于。

[220]reductionist,简化论的。

[221]condition,对……产生影响，调节。

[222]fall out,争吵、闹翻。

[223]unit-level,个体层次的。

[224]analogous,类似的、相似的。

[225]appeasement,抚慰，绥靖。